Policy Components of Arms Competition

Mathew D. McCubbins

Duke University School of Law

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 385-406, August 1983

This report suggests and justifies a simple approach to arms competitions, wherein arms competitions are viewed as disaggregated competition between pairs of weapons systems for executing mutually incompatible policy goals. This approach is derived from a decision theoretic model of armament choice, in which military decision makers make trade-offs between alternative strategies of weapons deployment to achieve national foreign policy objectives. Data representing a cross section of the U.S. and USSR military arsenals are employed in a quasi first-difference two-stage least squared analysis to provide evidence for the propositions of the model and this approach.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Keywords: arms, arms competition, armament choice, foreign policy, United States, USSR

JEL Classification: C31, C70, D78, H56

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Date posted: July 23, 2007  

Suggested Citation

McCubbins, Mathew D., Policy Components of Arms Competition. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 385-406, August 1983 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002402

Contact Information

Mathew D. McCubbins (Contact Author)
Duke University School of Law ( email )
210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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