Abstract

 
 

References (74)



 


 



When Does More Aid Imply Less Democracy? An Empirical Examination


Sarantis C. Kalyvitis


Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of International and European Economic Studies

Irene Vlachaki


Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of International and European Economic Studies

January 2011


Abstract:     
Foreign aid flows have increased considerably during the last decades targeting, apart from the economic development of recipient countries, several goals related to their democratization process. In this paper we investigate whether aggregate aid has a differential impact on the future political regime of recipient countries. To this end, we use annual data on Net Official Development Assistance covering 64 aid-recipients over the period 1967-1999. We find that aid flows have an adverse impact on the likelihood of observing a democratic regime in the recipient. This effect is particularly strong in countries with bad economic and social conditions, but it is nearly zero in good environments. In addition, the negative effect of aid is moderated when aid flows are preceded by economic liberalization.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: democratization, foreign aid, binary model, endogeneity

JEL Classification: D70, F35, C25

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 23, 2007 ; Last revised: January 6, 2011

Suggested Citation

Kalyvitis, Sarantis C. and Vlachaki, Irene, When Does More Aid Imply Less Democracy? An Empirical Examination (January 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002433 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1002433

Contact Information

Sarantis C. Kalyvitis
Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of International and European Economic Studies ( email )
Patission Str 76
GR-10434 Athens
Greece
Irene Vlachaki (Contact Author)
Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of International and European Economic Studies ( email )
76 Patission Street
Athens, 104 34
Greece
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,228
Downloads: 342
Download Rank: 41,316
References:  74

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.406 seconds