Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002468
 
 

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Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1980-2002


William Chandler


University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science

Gary W. Cox


Stanford University

Mathew D. McCubbins


Duke University


German Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2006

Abstract:     
We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties' (and not government parties') roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties skyrocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 percent leftward under a leftist government.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Germany, Parliament, Bundestag, agenda control, legislative agenda, legislatures

JEL Classification: D72, N40

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Date posted: July 23, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Chandler, William and Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Mathew D., Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1980-2002. German Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002468

Contact Information

William Chandler (Contact Author)
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
Code 0521
La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
United States
Gary W. Cox
Stanford University ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-723-4278 (Phone)
Mathew D. McCubbins
Duke University ( email )
Department of Political Science
208 Gross Hall, 140 Science Drive
Durham, NC 27708
United States
(213) 973-7538 (Phone)
(213) 973-3623 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mccubbins.us
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