Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1980-2002
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science
Gary W. Cox
Mathew D. McCubbins
Duke University School of Law
German Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2006
We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties' (and not government parties') roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties skyrocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 percent leftward under a leftist government.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29
Keywords: Germany, Parliament, Bundestag, agenda control, legislative agenda, legislatures
JEL Classification: D72, N40
Date posted: July 23, 2007
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