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Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1980-2002William ChandlerUniversity of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science Gary W. CoxStanford University Mathew D. McCubbinsUniversity of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science German Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2006 Abstract: We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties' (and not government parties') roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties skyrocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 percent leftward under a leftist government.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29 Keywords: Germany, Parliament, Bundestag, agenda control, legislative agenda, legislatures JEL Classification: D72, N40 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: July 23, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
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