Agenda Power in Brazil's Camara Dos Deputados, 1989-98
Gary W. Cox
Mathew D. McCubbins
Duke University School of Law
Octavio Amorim Neto
affiliation not provided to SSRN
World Politics, Vol. 55, pp. 550-78, July 2003
In this article we explore the proposition that all majority governments in systems allowing joint tenure of legislative and executive posts constitute what we call parliamentary agenda cartels. We define what an agenda cartel is, describe how to detect cartels empirically, and provide background information on Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. We then provide evidence on the structure of veto power in Brazil and test the cartel thesis. We show that Brazil has experienced only one true majority government, that of Cardoso, since the promulgation of the newly democratic constitution in October 1988. Moreover, it is only under Cardoso that an agenda cartel formed.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30
Keywords: agenda control, Camara dos Deputados, legislatures, legislative agenda, Brazil
JEL Classification: D72, N40
Date posted: July 26, 2007
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