Abstract

 
 

Citations (6)



 
 

Footnotes (68)



 


 



Agenda Power in Brazil's Camara Dos Deputados, 1989-98


Gary W. Cox


Stanford University

Mathew D. McCubbins


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science

Octavio Amorim Neto


affiliation not provided to SSRN


World Politics, Vol. 55, pp. 550-78, July 2003

Abstract:     
In this article we explore the proposition that all majority governments in systems allowing joint tenure of legislative and executive posts constitute what we call parliamentary agenda cartels. We define what an agenda cartel is, describe how to detect cartels empirically, and provide background information on Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. We then provide evidence on the structure of veto power in Brazil and test the cartel thesis. We show that Brazil has experienced only one true majority government, that of Cardoso, since the promulgation of the newly democratic constitution in October 1988. Moreover, it is only under Cardoso that an agenda cartel formed.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: agenda control, Camara dos Deputados, legislatures, legislative agenda, Brazil

JEL Classification: D72, N40

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 26, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Cox, Gary W., McCubbins, Mathew D. and Neto, Octavio Amorim, Agenda Power in Brazil's Camara Dos Deputados, 1989-98. World Politics, Vol. 55, pp. 550-78, July 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002807

Contact Information

Gary W. Cox (Contact Author)
Stanford University ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-723-4278 (Phone)
Mathew D. McCubbins
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science ( email )
FBE 06515, Mail Code 0804
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0804
United States
(213)740-5036 (Phone)
Octavio Amorim Neto
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
No Address Available
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 612
Downloads: 136
Download Rank: 106,425
Citations:  6
Footnotes:  68

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.469 seconds