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Agenda Power in Brazil's Camara Dos Deputados, 1989-98Gary W. CoxStanford University Mathew D. McCubbinsUniversity of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science Octavio Amorim Netoaffiliation not provided to SSRN World Politics, Vol. 55, pp. 550-78, July 2003 Abstract: In this article we explore the proposition that all majority governments in systems allowing joint tenure of legislative and executive posts constitute what we call parliamentary agenda cartels. We define what an agenda cartel is, describe how to detect cartels empirically, and provide background information on Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. We then provide evidence on the structure of veto power in Brazil and test the cartel thesis. We show that Brazil has experienced only one true majority government, that of Cardoso, since the promulgation of the newly democratic constitution in October 1988. Moreover, it is only under Cardoso that an agenda cartel formed.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30 Keywords: agenda control, Camara dos Deputados, legislatures, legislative agenda, Brazil JEL Classification: D72, N40 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: July 26, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
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