Agenda Power in the Japanese House of Representatives

Abstract:     
In this paper we provide evidence from Japan that bears on a general theory of agenda power in legislatures. We look in particular at two questions: (1) How large is the government's agenda (i.e., how many bills does it seek to push through to enactment), as a function of opposition institutional power (control of upper house and lower house committee chairs)? (2) How controversial is the government's agenda— i.e., how many bills do opposition parties oppose—again as a function of opposition institutional power? Our results, based on analyses of the period 1977-96, show that the controversialness of the government's agenda in Japan declines when the opposition controls more lower-house committee chairs. Controversialness also declines—substantially—when the opposition holds a majority in the upper house. However, the size of the government's agenda, at least by our crude measure, is unaffected by changes in these two institutional features.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: Japan, House of Representatives, agenda control, legislative agenda, legislatures

JEL Classification: D72, N40

Accepted Paper Series