Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002824
 
 

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As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan's LDP


Michael F. Thies


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Political Science

Mathew D. McCubbins


Duke University


Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 293-328, August 1997

Abstract:     
For 38 years, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) maintained single-party control over the Japanese government. This lack of partisan turnover in government has frustrated attempts to explain Japanese government policy changes using political variables. In this paper, we look for intraparty changes that may have led to changes in Japanese budgetary policy. Using a simple model of agenda-setting, we hypothesize that changes in which intraparty factions "control" the LDP affect the party's decisions over spending priorities systematically. This runs contrary to the received wisdom in the voluminous literature on LDP factions, which asserts that factions, whatever their raison d'être, do not exhibit different policy preferences. We find that strong correlations do exist between which factions comprise the agenda-setting party "mainstream" and how the government allocates spending across pork-barrel and public goods items.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 55

Keywords: Liberal Democratic Party, Japan, budgetary policy, public goods, pork-barrel

JEL Classification: H61, N45, H41, H42

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Date posted: July 25, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Thies, Michael F. and McCubbins, Mathew D., As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan's LDP. Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 293-328, August 1997. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002824

Contact Information

Michael F. Thies (Contact Author)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Political Science ( email )
405 Hilgard Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472
United States
310-825-1976 (Phone)
310-825-0778 (Fax)
Mathew D. McCubbins
Duke University ( email )
Department of Political Science
208 Gross Hall, 140 Science Drive
Durham, NC 277080204
United States
(213) 973-7538 (Phone)
(213) 973-3623 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mccubbins.us
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