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A Leverage Theory of Reputation Building with Co-Branding: Complementarity in Reputation Building


Jay Pil Choi


Michigan State University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Doh-Shin Jeon


Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

March 2007


Abstract:     
We present a leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding. We show that under certain conditions, co-branding that links unknown firms in a new sector with established firms in a mature sector allows the unknown firms to signal a high product quality and establish their own reputation. We compare this situation with a benchmark in which both sectors are new and firms signal their quality only with prices. We investigate how this comparison is affected by the nature of the technology linking the two sectors and a cross-sector inference problem that consumers might face in identifying the true cause of product failure. We find that co-branding facilitates the process in which a Þrm in the new sector to signal its product quality only if the co-branding sectors produce complementary inputs and consumers face a cross-sector inference problem. We apply our insight to economics of superstars, multinational firms and co-authorship.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Leverage, Co-branding, Complementarity in Reputation Building, Inference Problem

JEL Classification: D82, L15, M31

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Date posted: July 25, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Choi, Jay Pil and Jeon, Doh-Shin, A Leverage Theory of Reputation Building with Co-Branding: Complementarity in Reputation Building (March 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002882 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1002882

Contact Information

Jay Pil Choi
Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )
101 Marshall Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-353-7281 (Phone)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Doh-Shin Jeon (Contact Author)
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(34) 93 542 16 57 (Phone)
(34) 93 542 17 46 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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