Who Controls? Information and the Structure of Legislative Decision Making
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Political Science
Mathew D. McCubbins
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 3, August 1994
Legislatures around the world first delegate some of their policy making authority to experts and then accept their delegates' proposals without question or amendment. Many scholars see this combination of events as evidence that complexity lead elected representatives to lose control of the actions of government. While we agree that complexity and delegation can render legislatures powerless, we argue that legislators around the world can, and do, overcome these politically damaging forces. Specifically, we use a model of legislative behavior to show how both institutional characteristics and conditions that allow people to learn from others provide legislators with the faculty to protect their interests. We conclude that certain structural characteristics, such as those found in the United States Congress, allow ordinary legislators to exert considerable control over the actions of government and that other characteristics, such as those found in Britain and Japan, render most legislators relatively powerless.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 14
Keywords: legislatures, policy making, delegation, information, legislative decision making
JEL Classification: D81, D82, D72, D73Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: July 26, 2007
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.219 seconds