Abstract

 
 

Citations (11)



 
 

Footnotes (28)



 


 



Agenda Power in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1877 to 1986


Gary W. Cox


Stanford University

Mathew D. McCubbins


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science


PARTIES, PROCEDURE AND POLICY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS, David W. Brady, Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., Stanford University Press, 2002

Abstract:     
This essay defends the view that committee government is best thought of as a decentralized form of party government over a wide range of congressional history. We stress the following points. First, consistent with the notion of conditional party government, more homogeneous majority parties have systematically undertaken larger substantive agendas. Second, throughout all periods of congressional history from the end of Reconstruction to the present, the majority party has maintained a secure grip on the floor agenda. Third, the extremely low rates at which the majority party loses, when it attempts to prevent either the appearance of a bill on the floor agenda or a bill's final passage, has important consequences for how we understand phenomena such as the Conservative Coalition. Fourth, the majority's ability to keep things off the floor agenda has important policy implications.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 70

Keywords: party government, congress, legislative agenda, congressional history

JEL Classification: D72

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 27, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Mathew D., Agenda Power in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1877 to 1986. PARTIES, PROCEDURE AND POLICY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS, David W. Brady, Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., Stanford University Press, 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003328

Contact Information

Gary W. Cox (Contact Author)
Stanford University ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-723-4278 (Phone)
Mathew D. McCubbins
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science ( email )
FBE 06515, Mail Code 0804
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0804
United States
(213)740-5036 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 955
Downloads: 192
Download Rank: 77,739
Citations:  11
Footnotes:  28

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.453 seconds