Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003391
 
 

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Citations (22)



 


 



The Economics of Product-Line Restrictions with an Application to the Network Neutrality Debate


Benjamin E. Hermalin


University of California, Berkeley

Michael L. Katz


University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group

February 2007

AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 07-02

Abstract:     
We examine the welfare effects of product-line restrictions, such as those called for by some proponents of network neutrality regulation. We consider a platform that brings together households and application providers. We find that restricting a monopoly platform to a single product has the following effects: (a) application providers that would otherwise have purchased a low-quality variant are excluded from the market; (b) applications "in the middle" of the market utilize a higher and more efficient quality; and (c) applications at the top utilize a lower and less efficient quality than otherwise. Total surplus may rise or fall, although the analysis suggests to us that harm to welfare is likely. We also examine a duopoly model and find that the welfare effects are similar.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: product-line restrictions, duopoly model, welfare effects

JEL Classification: H00

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Date posted: July 30, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Hermalin, Benjamin E. and Katz, Michael L., The Economics of Product-Line Restrictions with an Application to the Network Neutrality Debate (February 2007). AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 07-02. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003391 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1003391

Contact Information

Benjamin E. Hermalin (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-7575 (Phone)
510-643-1420 (Fax)
Michael Louis Katz
University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group ( email )
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
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