Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=10036
 


 



Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize Informed Traders?


Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos


Indiana University - Robert H. McKinney School of Law


International Review of Law and Economics.

Abstract:     
Author's description of his article: In this article I argue that disclosure rules are necessary for the market's liquidity. Disclosure is a subsidy to informed traders, which allows them to maintain greater market efficiency. This efficiency is not of equal value to all shareholders. Long term shareholders, who do not expect to liquidate their holdings frequently, have less use for disclosure than short-term holders, who expect to trade frequently. Without mandatory disclosure, the long-term holders, who do not benefit from accurate prices as much, would prefer less disclosure. Thus, disclosure rules shorten the average term for holding shares, increasing uninformed trading volume and liquidity. Uninformed trading volume and liquidity are necessary for informed trading and efficiency.

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G18

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: July 5, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Georgakopoulos, Nicholas L., Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize Informed Traders?. International Review of Law and Economics.. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=10036

Contact Information

Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos (Contact Author)
Indiana University - Robert H. McKinney School of Law ( email )
530 West New York Street
Indianapolis, IN 46202
United States
317-274-1825 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.nicholasgeorgakopoulos.org

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