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A Study of Firms Surrounding the Threshold of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Compliance

Maria E. Nondorf
University of California, Berkeley - Accounting Group

Zvi Singer
McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management

Haifeng You
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Accounting


October 31, 2007

AAA 2008 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Paper

Abstract:     
This study examines firms surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 market value compliance threshold. We predict that management will behave opportunistically to affect their firm's market value in order to temporarily fall below the threshold. We find evidence that sample firms reduce their market value only during threshold measurement quarters, while control firms experience increasing market value. For threshold firms, dampened stock returns and insider trading function to reduce float. We consider this evidence of regulatory avoidance, confirming managers' beliefs regarding the net costs of the regulation. Additionally, we find that firms with the ability and incentives to avoid Section 404 do so.

Keywords: Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, Regulatory Avoidance, Small Firms

JEL Classifications: G34, G38, G32

Working Paper Series

Date posted: August 07, 2007 ; Last revised: January 17, 2008

Suggested Citation

Nondorf, Maria E., Singer, Zvi and You, Haifeng, A Study of Firms Surrounding the Threshold of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Compliance (October 31, 2007). AAA 2008 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1004965


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Contact Information

Maria E. Nondorf (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Accounting Group ( email )
Haas School of Business
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
Zvi Singer
McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management ( email )
1001 Sherbrooke St. W
Montreal, Quebec H3A 1G5 Canada
(514) 398-6240 (Phone)
Haifeng You
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Accounting ( email )
Clear Water Bay
Kowloon Hong Kong
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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