Vertical Restraints, Competition, and the Rule of Reason
University of Wisconsin Law School
August 7, 2007
This paper, prepared as a chapter for a forthcoming book on the Law and Economics of Antitrust, examines the rule of reason and its application to vertical restraints after the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Leegin v Kat's Korner. The author argues that the decision can be understood in terms of contrasting theories of competition and the role of property rights and provides a contrast between the current US approach and the categorical approach to regulating vertical restraints in the European Union.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27
Keywords: Antitrust, Competition Policy, Law and Economics, Intellectual Property
JEL Classification: K21, L42working papers series
Date posted: August 10, 2007
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