Inequality and Media Capture
Princeton University; New Economic School (NES)
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 92, Nos. 1-2, pp. 183-212, February 2008
People's support of redistributive policies depends on information they have about the tax system and efficiency of public projects. Mass media provides a convenient means for manipulating public opinion, even when voters understand that the media can be biased. I develop a theory of media capture in which the rich can influence information published in a media outlet at a cost. The model shows that higher inequality is associated with lower media freedom; this effect is stronger in democratic regimes. I find empirical support for the model in both panel data and cross-country models.
Keywords: inequality, redistribution, mass media, taxation, public goods
JEL Classification: D31, D72, H41Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: August 27, 2007 ; Last revised: January 27, 2008
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.641 seconds