Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=10072
 
 

Citations



 


 



Corporate Ownership Structures: Private Versus Social Optimality


Lucian A. Bebchuk


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Luigi Zingales


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


Working Paper #181, Harvard Law School Center for Law and Economics

Abstract:     
This paper analyzes the inefficiencies that might arise in the ownership structure chosen at the initial public offering stage. We show that, contrary to what is commonly believed, the desire of initial owners to maximize their proceeds leads them to choices that, although privately optimal, may be socially inefficient. This distortion tends to be in the direction of excessive incidence of controlling shareholder structures and excessive divestment of cash flow rights. Our analysis has far-reaching policy implications for dual class stock, stock pyramiding, sale of control rules, and public offerings of minority shares. Among its positive implications, our analysis suggests reasons for the substantial differences in the incidence of control blocks across different countries.

JEL Classification: G32, G38

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: June 6, 1996  

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Zingales, Luigi, Corporate Ownership Structures: Private Versus Social Optimality. Published as "Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go Public," in Concentrated Corporate Ownership, pp. 55-75, 2000. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=10072

Contact Information

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-496-3119 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Luigi Zingales
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-3196 (Phone)
773-834-2081 (Fax)

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN


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