Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self
Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia
Philosophical Issues, Vol. 17, 2007
I consider the relation among three views.
(A) Externalism about content.
(B) Internalism about the self.
(C) An epistemic conception of the limits of the self.
Most contemporary philosophers accept (A) and (B). I call the conjunction of these two claims standard externalism. Standard externalism contrasts with 'extended mind' externalism, which accepts (A) but rejects (B). Standard externalists are largely silent as to how they conceive the self; statement (C) simply expresses one natural conception of the self. I argue that this triad (A)-(C) is unstable, in that plausible ways of specifying the epistemic features mentioned in (C) yield conceptions of the self that undermine standard externalism. But rejecting (C), by adopting a non-epistemic conception of the self, is equally unpromising. This best option is to reject (A) or (B), and thereby to reject standard externalism.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 18
Keywords: externalism, mental content, self, personal identity, extended mindAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: August 16, 2007
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.453 seconds