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Money or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental Consequences of Uncompensated Land-Use Controls

Jonathan H. Adler
Case Western Reserve University - School of Law


August 2007

Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-26

Abstract:     
The conventional wisdom holds that requiring compensation for environmental land-use controls would severely limit environmental protection efforts. There are increasing reasons to question this assumption. Both economic theory and recent empirical research demonstrate that failing to compensate private landowners for the costs of environmental regulations discourages voluntary conservation efforts and can encourage the destruction of environmental resources. The lack of a compensation requirement also means that land-use regulation is underpriced as compared to other environmental protection measures for which government agencies must pay. This results in the "overconsumption" of land-use regulations relative to other environmental protection measures that could be more cost-effective at advancing conservation goals. While any specific compensation proposal would present implementation questions, there are reasons to believe that a compensation requirement could improve environmental conservation efforts.

Keywords: regulatory takings, takings compensation, species conservation, property rights, fiscal illusion, land-use control

JEL Classifications: K11, K30, K32, Q24

Working Paper Series

Date posted: August 17, 2007 ; Last revised: September 03, 2007

Suggested Citation

Adler, Jonathan H., Money or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental Consequences of Uncompensated Land-Use Controls (August 2007). Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-26. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007467


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Jonathan H. Adler (Contact Author)
Case Western Reserve University - School of Law ( email )
11075 East Boulevard
Cleveland, OH 44106-7148
United States
216-368-2535 (Phone)
216-368-2086 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.jhadler.net
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