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Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy RegimePatrick BoltonColumbia Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Olivier JeanneInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees (ENPC); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) August 2007 IMF Working Paper No. 07/192 Abstract: In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show however, that competition for repayment among lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29 Keywords: Sovereign debt, Debt restructuring, Bankruptcy, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, Working Paper working papers seriesDate posted: August 23, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
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