Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime
Columbia Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees (ENPC); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
IMF Working Paper No. 07/192
In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show however, that competition for repayment among lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29
Keywords: Sovereign debt, Debt restructuring, Bankruptcy, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, Working Paperworking papers series
Date posted: August 23, 2007
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 1.735 seconds