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The Cost-Benefit State

Cass R. Sunstein
Harvard University - Harvard Law School


May 1996

University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 39

Abstract:     
Gradually, and in fits and starts, the American regulatory state is becoming a cost-benefit state. This essay argues on behalf of the transformation, as a method for overcoming selective attention, public ignorance, "legislation by anecdote," and rent-seeking. At the same time it identifies three serious risks in current theory and practice: excessive proceduralism; engrafting cost-benefit requirements on top of existing command-and-control regulation; and using the criterion of private willingness to pay in contexts for which that criterion is ill-suited. The essay urges a shift from command-and-control to more flexible strategies, including "environmental contracting." It also attempts to identify and cast light on the most complex issues involving valuation of regulatory benefits.

Working Paper Series

Date posted: June 12, 1998 ; Last revised: June 22, 1999

Suggested Citation

Sunstein, Cass R., The Cost-Benefit State (May 1996). University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 39. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=10083


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Contact Information

Cass R. Sunstein (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts Ave
Areeda Hall 225
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2291 (Phone)
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