Responding to Threats of Terrorism: How the Law Can Generate Appropriate Incentives

Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, Vol. 18, No. 1

26 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2007

See all articles by Anthony Ogus

Anthony Ogus

The University of Manchester - School of Law; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law

Abstract

A law-and-economics framework of analysis is adopted to assess the likely effectiveness of counter-terrorist regulatory measures. The analysis suggests that ex post deterrence measures are likely to be less cost-effective than ex ante preventative measures, and, among the latter, controls restricting access to weapons and increasing security at potential targets are likely to be more cost-effective than those restricting the movements of suspected individuals.

Keywords: terrorism, deterrence, regulation

JEL Classification: H56, K14, K29

Suggested Citation

Ogus, Anthony I., Responding to Threats of Terrorism: How the Law Can Generate Appropriate Incentives. Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, Vol. 18, No. 1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1008771

Anthony I. Ogus (Contact Author)

The University of Manchester - School of Law ( email )

Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.manchester.ac.uk/aboutus/staff/anthony_ogus/default.html

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 -10-408-1585 (Phone)

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