Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=10088
 
 

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Those Japanese Firms with Their Disdain for Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy


Steven N. Kaplan


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

J. Mark Ramseyer


Harvard Law School


Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 74, Issue 2 (1996).

Abstract:     
From time to time, observers argue that important facets of corporate governance are explicable only in path-dependent terms. Some buttress this claim with comparisons between U.S. and Japanese patterns of corporate governance. Using data that Kaplan has discussed in other contexts, we dispute the empirical foundation of this path-dependence claim. In fact, we find that U.S. and Japanese governance patterns are remarkably similar. We suggest that this similarity may imply that competitive product, capital and labor markets largely vitiate historically based idiosyncracies in governance.

JEL Classification: G34

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: May 19, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Kaplan, Steven N. and Ramseyer, J. Mark, Those Japanese Firms with Their Disdain for Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy. Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 74, Issue 2 (1996).. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=10088

Contact Information

Steven Neil Kaplan (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-4513 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
J. Mark Ramseyer
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-4878 (Phone)
617-496-6118 (Fax)
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