Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008926
 
 

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A Multi-Dimensional View of Alliance Complexity and Value Division in Technology Sourcing Agreements


Zeynep K. Hansen


Washington University in Saint Louis - John M. Olin Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Matthew John Higgins


Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

August 15, 2008


Abstract:     
Most research on alliances ignores the structures of the underlying relationships as codified by contract. By overlooking these structures the complexity of the fundamental relationship is ignored. This is problematic since it is how these relationships are codified and how control rights are allocated that dictate how firms will benefit (or not) from an alliance. We present a novel method to analyze the determinants of alliance complexity in a multi-dimensional framework. We then look at the effect these same determinants have on the allocation of control rights between firms. From a transaction cost perspective we can begin to look at the cost/benefit of entering more (or less) complex agreements in terms of the allocation of rights (i.e., value appropriation). This approach provides a new framework in which to begin to think about the net effect alliance portfolios have on a firm.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Contractual complexity, Control rights, Strategic alliances, Biopharmaceutical industry, Contractual design

JEL Classification: G32, L22

working papers series


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Date posted: August 23, 2007 ; Last revised: December 21, 2008

Suggested Citation

Hansen, Zeynep K. and Higgins, Matthew John, A Multi-Dimensional View of Alliance Complexity and Value Division in Technology Sourcing Agreements (August 15, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008926 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1008926

Contact Information

Zeynep Kocabiyik Hansen
Washington University in Saint Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )
One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Matthew John Higgins (Contact Author)
Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology ( email )
800 West Peachtree Street
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States
404-894-4368 (Phone)
404-894-6030 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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