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Director Compensation and CEO Bargaining Power in REITsZhilan FengUnion College Chinmoy GhoshUniversity of Connecticut - School of Business C. F. SirmansFlorida State University - Department of Risk Management, Insurance, Real Estate & Business Law Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2007 Abstract: We analyze director compensation for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and investigate the relations between director compensation and other measures of the board independence and board monitoring. Using 136 REITs in 2001, we find that REITs that pay higher equity-based compensation to their board members are associated with higher financial performance. Our data indicate that board equity-based compensation is positively related to the existence of an independent nomination committee, however, it has no significant relationship with board size, proportion of outside directors, CEO duality and CEO tenure and ownership.
Keywords: director compensation, nomination committee, CEO involvement, real estate investment trust (REITs) Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: August 26, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
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