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Litigating to Regulate: Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency


Andrew P. Morriss


University of Alabama School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center; George Mason University - Mercatus Center


U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE07-028
Cato Supreme Court Review, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
In Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007), the Supreme Court weakened the rules governing standing and overturned an Environmental Protection Agency decision not to regulate mobile source emissions of greenhouse gases. This article, forthcoming in the Cato Supreme Court Review, critiques both aspects of the Court's decision. The relaxation of standing rules is unfortunate because it makes it easier for interest groups to press for special interest regulation by agencies. In this case, the states that sought to force EPA to regulate were largely ones whose energy consumption is less dependent on hydrocarbon sources than the median, while those supporting the agency were largely more dependent on hydrocarbons for their energy supplies than the median. With respect to the appropriateness of regulation of mobile source greenhouse gas emissions, the Court's opinion ignores the interests created by the structure of the Clean Air Act.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

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Date posted: August 26, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Morriss, Andrew P., Litigating to Regulate: Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency. U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE07-028; Cato Supreme Court Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1009652

Contact Information

Andrew P. Morriss (Contact Author)
University of Alabama School of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 870382
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center ( email )
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States
George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )
3401 N. Fairfax Dr.
Ste. 450
Arlington, VA 22201-4433
United States
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