Agenda Power in the U.S. Senate, 1877 to 1986
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Gary W. Cox
Mathew D. McCubbins
Duke University School of Law
PARTIES, PROCEDURE AND POLICY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS, David W. Brady & Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., Stanford University Press, 2002
The following analysis is an attempt to better understand the processes and implications of agenda control within the U.S. Senate. In particular, we study the extent to which the Senate majority party exercises negative agenda controlthe ability to prevent bills that the party dislikes from being approved by the Senate. We look at Senate originated bills and executive nominations that make it to the chamber floor for a final passage vote. The cartel agenda model presented by Cox and McCubbins (2001) provides the theoretical framework for our analysis (henceforth, we refer to this as the "cartel model"). We extend this model to the Senate, and perform tests similar to those presented in Cox and McCubbins' study of the lower House.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30
Keywords: Senate, Agenda control, congress, cartel agenda model, parties
Date posted: August 28, 2007
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