Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010000
 
 

Citations (13)



 


 



Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions


D. Roderick Kiewiet


California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Mathew D. McCubbins


Duke University


American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 713-736, August 1988

Abstract:     
Investigates the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding annual appropriations legislation in the United States. Spatial model of the appropriations process; Basic sequence of actions which constitute the annual funding process; Congressional limitations on the veto; Presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure level in the appropriations process.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: Congress, President, Veto, appropriations, expenditures

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Date posted: August 28, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and McCubbins, Mathew D., Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 713-736, August 1988. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010000

Contact Information

D. Roderick Kiewiet (Contact Author)
California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626 395-4032 (Phone)
Mathew D. McCubbins
Duke University ( email )
Department of Political Science
208 Gross Hall, 140 Science Drive
Durham, NC 277080204
United States
(213) 973-7538 (Phone)
(213) 973-3623 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mccubbins.us
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