Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions
D. Roderick Kiewiet
California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Mathew D. McCubbins
Duke University School of Law
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 713-736, August 1988
Investigates the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding annual appropriations legislation in the United States. Spatial model of the appropriations process; Basic sequence of actions which constitute the annual funding process; Congressional limitations on the veto; Presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure level in the appropriations process.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25
Keywords: Congress, President, Veto, appropriations, expenditures
Date posted: August 28, 2007
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