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A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion


Randall Calvert


Washington University in Saint Louis - Department of Political Science

Mathew D. McCubbins


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science

Barry R. Weingast


Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3, August 1989

Abstract:     
Focuses on the theory of political control and government agency discretion in the United States. Process of policy execution; Definition of agency discretion; Roles of players in determination of policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: delegation, agency loss, congress, bureaucracy

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Date posted: August 28, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Calvert, Randall, McCubbins, Mathew D. and Weingast, Barry R., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3, August 1989. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010068

Contact Information

Randall Calvert (Contact Author)
Washington University in Saint Louis - Department of Political Science ( email )
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States
Mathew D. McCubbins
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science ( email )
FBE 06515, Mail Code 0804
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0804
United States
(213)740-5036 (Phone)
Barry R. Weingast
Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-723-0497 (Phone)
650-723-1808 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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