Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010068
 
 

Citations (24)



 


 



A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion


Randall Calvert


Washington University in Saint Louis - Department of Political Science

Mathew D. McCubbins


Duke University

Barry R. Weingast


Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace


American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3, August 1989

Abstract:     
Focuses on the theory of political control and government agency discretion in the United States. Process of policy execution; Definition of agency discretion; Roles of players in determination of policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: delegation, agency loss, congress, bureaucracy

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Date posted: August 28, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Calvert, Randall and McCubbins, Mathew D. and Weingast, Barry R., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3, August 1989. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010068

Contact Information

Randall Calvert (Contact Author)
Washington University in Saint Louis - Department of Political Science ( email )
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States
Mathew D. McCubbins
Duke University ( email )
Department of Political Science
208 Gross Hall, 140 Science Drive
Durham, NC 27708
United States
(213) 973-7538 (Phone)
(213) 973-3623 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mccubbins.us
Barry R. Weingast
Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-723-0497 (Phone)
650-723-1808 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/
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