Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010068
 
 

Citations (24)



 


 



A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion


Randall Calvert


Washington University in Saint Louis - Department of Political Science

Mathew D. McCubbins


Duke University School of Law

Barry R. Weingast


Stanford University, Department of Political Science


American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3, August 1989

Abstract:     
Focuses on the theory of political control and government agency discretion in the United States. Process of policy execution; Definition of agency discretion; Roles of players in determination of policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: delegation, agency loss, congress, bureaucracy


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Date posted: August 28, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Calvert, Randall and McCubbins, Mathew D. and Weingast, Barry R., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3, August 1989. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010068

Contact Information

Randall Calvert (Contact Author)
Washington University in Saint Louis - Department of Political Science ( email )
One Brookings Drive
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States
Mathew D. McCubbins
Duke University School of Law ( email )
210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
Barry R. Weingast
Stanford University, Department of Political Science ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-723-0497 (Phone)
650-723-1808 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/
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