Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=10105
 


 



The Canadian Keiretsu


F. H. Buckley


George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

May 1996


Abstract:     
This Article describes the Canadian Keiretsu, in which a main Chartered Bank dominates an interlocking group of clients, investment dealers, trust companies, and professional advisors. The keiretsu facilitates information-sharing and monitoring strategies amongst group members, and also reduces the agency costs of banker misbehavior. Most major Canadian firms are members of a keiretsu, and the Canadian economy is far more concentrated than that of the United States. The difference is attributable to the less restrictive banking and bankruptcy laws of Canada, and ultimately to a distinctly non-populist historical experience.

JEL Classification: G32, G34


Not Available For Download

Date posted: May 3, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Buckley, F. H., The Canadian Keiretsu (May 1996 ). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=10105

Contact Information

Francis (Frank) H. Buckley (Contact Author)
George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-8028 (Phone)
703-993-8088 (Fax)

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