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Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
Dan Ariely Duke University Fuqua Schoo lof Business Anat Bracha Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics Stephan Meier Federal Reserve Bank of Boston; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Columbia University August 2007 IZA Discussion Paper No. 2968 FRB of Boston Working Paper No. 07-9 Abstract: This paper experimentally examines image motivation - the desire to be liked and well-regarded by others - as a driver in prosocial behavior (doing good), and asks whether extrinsic monetary incentives (doing well) have a detrimental effect on prosocial behavior due to crowding out of image motivation. By definition, image depends on one's behavior being visible to other people. Using this unique property we show that image is indeed an important part of the motivation to behave prosocially. Moreover, we show that extrinsic incentives interact with image motivation and are therefore less effective in public than in private. Together, these results imply that image motivation is crowded out by monetary incentives; which in turn means that monetary incentives are more likely to be counterproductive for public prosocial activities than for private ones.
Keywords: prosocial behavior, extrinsic incentives, image motivation, experiments JEL Classifications: D64, C90, H41 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: August 29, 2007 ; Last revised: September 11, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
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