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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011233
 
 

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The Property Puzzle


Amnon Lehavi


Interdisciplinary Center Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law

August 9, 2008

Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 96, 2008

Abstract:     
This Article constructs a political and institutional model of property, offering an innovative approach for addressing some of property's most puzzling features. The central thesis of this Article is that regardless of our preferred substantive justifications for property, dramatic decisions about the giving or taking of property, such as the full-scale nonconsensual transfer of title and possession in land from one person to another, should be chiefly made by explicit and publicly-reasoned resolutions of governmental entities entrusted with the power and duty of collective decision making - chiefly legislative and administrative bodies - supervised in turn by the institution of judicial review.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: property, jurisprudence, private law, public law, judicial review, rawls, kant, takings, eminent domain, legislation, constitution

JEL Classification: K11, K41

working papers series





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Date posted: September 4, 2007 ; Last revised: May 28, 2009

Suggested Citation

Lehavi, Amnon, The Property Puzzle (August 9, 2008). Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 96, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011233 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1011233

Contact Information

Amnon Lehavi (Contact Author)
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 167
Herzliya, 46150
Israel
972 9 9602765 (Phone)
972 9 9568605 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.idc.ac.il
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