Knowledge of False Propositions
affiliation not provided to SSRN
September 3, 2007
'Everything you know is wrong' is, for the most part, held to be a contradiction. If a proposition is false then you do not know it, if you know it then it isn't wrong. I disagree. The statements 'I know P', 'he knows P' or 'it is known that P', to the extent that they imply truth imply a different kind of truth from the conventional correspondence-truth. The 'truth' implied is broadly in line with the Pragmatist view of truth. I contend that a (modified) Pragmatist view of truth is necessary, explore its nature, its effect in avoiding certain contemporary paradoxes of knowledge and explore how we can reconcile the Pragmatist view of truth with the correspondence theory of truth.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 11
Keywords: Knowledge, Epistemology, Truth, Pragmatismworking papers series
Date posted: September 13, 2007
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