Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011947
 
 

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Allocating Lawmaking Powers: Self-Regulation vs. Government Regulation


Peter Grajzl


Washington and Lee University - Department of Economics

Peter Murrell


University of Maryland - Department of Economics


Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 35, No. 3, September 2007

Abstract:     
Self-regulation is common, but comparative analysis of self-regulation and government regulation is rare. This paper identifies conditions determining whether regulation is delegated or centralized, analyzing the welfare implications of regulatory regime choice. Because regulatory authority determines who controls residual lawmaking, property rights theory provides the natural analytical framework, leading to a focus on trade-offs between efficient lawmaking by regulators and government-producer bargaining. Self-regulation's relative efficiency increases with uncertainty over institutional implementation, populism, and political polarization. Inefficient regulation occurs more frequently than inefficient self-regulation. Case studies examine legal origin's effect on regime choice and compare Progressive regulation to New Deal self-regulation.

Keywords: self-regulation, government regulation, property rights theory, legal origins, Progressive Era, New Deal

JEL Classification: D7, H1, K0, L5, P5

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: September 4, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Grajzl, Peter and Murrell, Peter, Allocating Lawmaking Powers: Self-Regulation vs. Government Regulation. Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 35, No. 3, September 2007 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011947

Contact Information

Peter Grajzl (Contact Author)
Washington and Lee University - Department of Economics ( email )
Lexington, VA 24450
United States
HOME PAGE: http://home.wlu.edu/~grajzlp/
Peter Murrell
University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )
College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-405-3476 (Phone)
301-405-3542 (Fax)
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