Abstract

 
 

References (66)



 
 

Citations (8)



 


 



Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships


Björn Bartling


University of Zurich - Department of Economics Library

Ferdinand Von Siemens


Goethe University Frankfurt

September 25, 2008

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Profits are most frequently shared equally among the partners. The purpose of our paper is to provide a rationale for equal sharing rules. We show that with inequity averse partners the equal sharing rule is the unique sharing rule that maximizes the agents' incentives to exert effort. We further show that inequity aversion can enhance efficiency in partnerships of given size, but that it can also cause partnerships to be inefficiently small.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: equal sharing rule, partnerships, incentives, peer pressure, inequity aversion

JEL Classification: D20, D86, J54

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: September 10, 2007 ; Last revised: June 2, 2011

Suggested Citation

Bartling, Björn and Von Siemens, Ferdinand, Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships (September 25, 2008). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011978

Contact Information

Björn Bartling (Contact Author)
University of Zurich - Department of Economics Library ( email )
Raemistrasse 71
Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland
Ferdinand Von Siemens
Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )
Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 879
Downloads: 131
Download Rank: 109,780
References:  66
Citations:  8

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.891 seconds