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Self-Enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-Cooperative Organization of ClansKai A. KonradMax Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Wolfgang LeiningerUniversity of Dortmund - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) June 2007 Ruhr Economic Paper No. 16 Abstract: We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29 Keywords: Free-riding, defence, collective action, distributional conflict, war, norms JEL Classification: D72, D74, H41 working papers seriesDate posted: September 11, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
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