The Limits of Group Rights: Religious Institutions and Religious Minorities in International Law
Bernadette A. Meyler
Stanford Law School
September 1, 2007
St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary, Vol. 22, p. 535, 2007
Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-013
Scholars and advocates of religious liberty within the United States are beginning to suggest that our constitutional discourse has focused too intently on individual rights and that our attention should now turn to the interests of religious institutions and the notion of church autonomy. The reoriented jurisprudence encouraged by such proposals is not without parallel in other national contexts, including those of Europe. Heeding calls to attend to church autonomy could thus bring the United States into closer harmony with its European counterparts. Placing priority on church autonomy might, however, generate unforeseen obstacles to the exercise of religious liberty. In particular, emphasizing religious institutions may lead to the unequal treatment of individuals and entities of minority religious persuasions. As this Symposium Article's analysis of pertinent cases from the jurisprudence of international tribunals demonstrates, the monolithic conception of religious associations that has emerged from an institutionally oriented approach to religious liberty has resulted in the neglect of the equality of free exercise on the individual level and, concomitantly, disregard for the freedom of religious dissent and sub-group formation. The piece concludes with a suggestion about how to avoid the pitfalls of both the individually and institutionally based approaches.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26
Keywords: religion, group rights, international lawAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 7, 2007 ; Last revised: August 26, 2009
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