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Measuring Private Information in a Rational Expectations Framework


Radu Burlacu Sr.


University of Grenoble 2 - ESA - CERAG

Patrice C. Fontaine


Eurofidai (CNRS and University of Grenoble 2)

Sonia G. Jimenez-Garcès


French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Centre de Recherches Appliquées à la Gestion (CERAG)

September 6, 2007


Abstract:     
This paper assesses the extent of stock asymmetric information by considering the relationship between stock returns and prices. We generalize Grossman, Sanford J. and Joseph E. Stiglitz model (1980) in a multi-asset setting and show that larger asymmetric information engenders stronger, negative correlation between assets' returns and prices. We propose an asymmetric information measure called AIM,which exploits this result. The empirical analysis shows that common stocks with higher AIM exhibit superior returns, confirming that investors require a premium for information risk. These results are robust to asset pricing models, asymmetric information measures, analyses periods, and variables known to affect stock returns.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: asymmetric information, private information, information-risk premium, rational expectations equilibrium models, price informativeness

JEL Classification: G12, G14, M41, D82

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Date posted: September 12, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Burlacu, Radu, Fontaine, Patrice C. and Jimenez-Garcès, Sonia G., Measuring Private Information in a Rational Expectations Framework (September 6, 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012616 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1012616

Contact Information

Radu Burlacu Sr.
University of Grenoble 2 - ESA - CERAG ( email )
Grenoble
France
Patrice C. Fontaine (Contact Author)
Eurofidai (CNRS and University of Grenoble 2) ( email )
150, rue de la Chimie - EUROFIDAI UMS CNRS 2748
Grenoble Cedex 9, BP47 - 380
France
Sonia G. Jimenez-Garcès
French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Centre de Recherches Appliquées à la Gestion (CERAG) ( email )
150 rue de la Chimie, BP47
GRENOBLE CEDEX, 38040
France
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