Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1013929
 
 

References (20)



 


 



Interoperability and Foreclosure in the European Microsoft Case


Kai-Uwe Kuhn


University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

John Van Reenen


London School of Economics - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP); Stanford Graduate School of Business; Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

August 2007


Abstract:     
In this paper we discuss some of the most important economic issues raised in European Commission vs. Microsoft (2004) concerning the market for work group servers. In our view, the most important economic issues relate to (a) foreclosure incentives and (b) innovation effects of the proposed remedy. We discuss the economic basis for the Commission's claims that Microsoft had incentives to exclude rivals in the work group server market through degrading the interoperability of their server operating systems with Windows. We also examine the impact of compulsory disclosure of information on interoperability and argue that the effects on innovation are not unambiguously negative as Microsoft claim. We conclude with some general implications of the case for anti-trust enforcement in high innovation sectors.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Foreclosure, Interoperability, abuse of dominant position, innovation, European Commission

JEL Classification: O3, L1, L4, L12, L41, L86

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Date posted: September 18, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Kuhn, Kai-Uwe and Van Reenen, John, Interoperability and Foreclosure in the European Microsoft Case (August 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1013929 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1013929

Contact Information

Kai-Uwe Kuhn (Contact Author)
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics ( email )
611 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220
United States
734-763-5317 (Phone)
734-764-2769 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
John Michael Van Reenen
London School of Economics - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 6976 (Phone)
+44 20 7955 6848 (Fax)
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) ( email )
7 Ridgmount Street
London, WC1E 7AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7240 6740 (Phone)
+44 20 7240 6136 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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