Patterns of Rainfall Insurance Participation in Rural India
World Bank - Development Economics Research Group and Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD)
Robert M. Townsend
MIT - Department of Economics
James I. Vickery
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
FRB of New York Staff Report No. 302
This paper describes the contract design and institutional features of an innovative rainfall insurance policy offered to smallholder farmers in rural India and presents preliminary evidence on the determinants of insurance participation. Insurance take-up is found to be decreasing in basis risk between insurance payouts and income fluctuations, higher among wealthy households, and lower among households that are credit constrained. These results match predictions of a simple neoclassical model appended with borrowing constraints. Other patterns are less consistent with the benchmark model. Namely, participation in village networks and measures of familiarity with the insurance vendor are strongly correlated with insurance take-up decisions, and risk averse households are found to be less, not more, likely to purchase insurance. We present evidence suggesting that these results reflect uncertainty about the product itself, given households' limited experience with it.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
Keywords: rainfall insurance, household finance, risk sharing, India
JEL Classification: O10, O16, G2, G22working papers series
Date posted: September 13, 2007
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