Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014264
 
 

References (47)



 
 

Citations (15)



 


 



Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance


Hui Chen


University of Colorado at Boulder

David C. Parsley


Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management; Vanderbilt University

Ya-wen Yang


Wake Forest University

July 22, 2013


Abstract:     
Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators, regulators, and courts, presumably to encourage favorable policies and/or outcomes. Using data made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, this study examines corporate lobbying activities from a financial perspective. We find that on average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial performance. These results are robust across a number of empirical specifications. We also report market performance evidence using a portfolio approach. We find that portfolios of firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks in the three years following portfolio formation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: Corporate Lobbying, political strategy, market returns, portfolio

JEL Classification: G3, G14, G18

working papers series


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Date posted: September 13, 2007 ; Last revised: August 11, 2013

Suggested Citation

Chen, Hui and Parsley, David C. and Yang, Ya-wen, Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance (July 22, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014264 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1014264

Contact Information

Hui Chen (Contact Author)
University of Colorado at Boulder ( email )
Leeds School of Business
Boulder, CO 80309
United States
David C. Parsley
Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management ( email )
401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-0649 (Phone)
615-343-7177 (Fax)
Vanderbilt University ( email )
401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-0649 (Phone)
615-343-7177 (Fax)

Ya-wen Yang
Wake Forest University ( email )
P.O. Box 7659
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
United States
336-758-2934 (Phone)
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