Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=10146
 


 



Was the Fairness Doctrine a 'Chilling Effect'?: Evidence from the Post-Deregulation Radio Market


Thomas W. Hazlett


George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law

David W. Sosa


Analysis Group, Inc.


Journal of Legal Studies,January 1997.

Abstract:     
The stated rationale for the Fairness Doctrine was to encourage more information to be aired by radio and TV stations, on the theory that private broadcasters would tend to underprovide a public good - news about important social issues. Yet, the danger has been seen, at the U.S. Supreme Court, the FCC, and elsewhere, that there exists a potentially unconstitutional "chilling effect": The prospect of having to award equal (unpaid) time to dissenting points of view constitutes a tax on controversial speech. After a brief review of the history of the Fairness Doctrine, we develop a model for the supply of informational programming in radio. In that the Doctrine was abolished in 1987, the radio market now allows us to observe licensees' unregulated choices in selecting the profit-maximizing quantity of informational programming. Industry data show a clear break in the trend around 1987, when informational formats began rising relative to others - evidence suggesting just the "chilling effect" feared by the Supreme Court.

JEL Classification: K23, L82

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: September 15, 1996  

Suggested Citation

Hazlett, Thomas W. and Sosa, David W., Was the Fairness Doctrine a 'Chilling Effect'?: Evidence from the Post-Deregulation Radio Market. Journal of Legal Studies,January 1997.. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=10146

Contact Information

Thomas W. Hazlett
George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law ( email )
George Mason School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-4244 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~thazlett/

George Mason Law School Logo

David W. Sosa (Contact Author)
Analysis Group, Inc. ( email )
San Francisco, CA 94111
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.analysisgroup.com/vps.htm#staff
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