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Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements

Michael R. Roberts
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department

Amir Sufi
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; NBER


July 31, 2008


Abstract:     
Using a large sample of private credit agreements between US publicly traded firms and financial institutions, we show that over 90% of long-term debt contracts are renegotiated prior to their stated maturity. Renegotiations result in large changes to the amount, maturity, and pricing of the contract, occur relatively early in the life of the contract, and are rarely a consequence of distress or default. Our analysis of the determinants of renegotiation reveal that the accrual of new information concerning the credit quality, investment opportunities, and collateral of the borrower, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations in credit and equity market conditions, are the primary determinants of renegotiation and its outcomes. The terms of the initial contract (e.g., contingencies) also play an important role in renegotiations; by altering the structure of the contract in a state contingent manner, renegotiation is partially controlled by the contractual assignment of bargaining power.

Keywords: Renegotiation, Bargaining, Incomplete Contracts, Security Design, Bank Loans

JEL Classifications: G32, G21, C78, L14

Working Paper Series

Date posted: September 28, 2007 ; Last revised: August 20, 2008

Suggested Citation

Roberts, Michael R. and Sufi, Amir, Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements (July 31, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017629


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Contact Information

Michael R. Roberts (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
(215) 573-9780 (Phone)
Amir Sufi
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
NBER ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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