|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Why Managers Hold Shares of Their Firm: An Empirical AnalysisUlf Von Lilienfeld-ToalStockholm School of Economics Stefan RuenziUniversity of Mannheim - Department of International Finance September 2007 Abstract: We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. Firms in which the CEO voluntarily holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by more than 10 percent p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors. The effect is most pronounced in firms that are characterized by large managerial discretion of the CEO. The abnormal returns we document are one potential explanation why so many CEOs hold a large fraction of their own company's stocks. We also examine several potential explanations why the existence of an owner CEO is not fully reflected in prices but leads to abnormal returns.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 40 Keywords: CEO-Ownership, Asset Pricing, Large Shareholders JEL Classification: G12, G30 working papers seriesDate posted: March 19, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.390 seconds
