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Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation

David A. Hirshleifer
University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business


October 2, 2007

European Financial Management Journal, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
I propose here the psychological attraction theory of financial regulation - that regulation is the result of psychological biases on the part of political participants - voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and media commentators; and of regulatory ideologies that exploit these biases. Some key elements of the psychological attraction approach are: salience and vividness, omission bias, scapegoating and xenophobia, fairness and reciprocity norms, overconfidence, and mood effects. This approach further emphasizes emergent effects that arise from the interactions of individuals with psychological biases. For example, availability cascades and ideological replicators have powerful effects on regulatory outcomes.

Keywords: Investor psychology, regulation, salience, omission bias, scapegoating, xenophobia, fairness, reciprocity, norms, mood, availability cascades, overconfidence, evolutionary psychology, memes, ideology, replicators

JEL Classifications: G18, H10

Working Paper Series

Date posted: October 03, 2007 ; Last revised: December 13, 2008

Suggested Citation

Hirshleifer, David A., Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation (October 2, 2007). European Financial Management Journal, Forthcoming . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1018820


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David A. Hirshleifer (Contact Author)
University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business ( email )
Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States
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