Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000
Gary W. Cox
State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Political Science
Mathew D. McCubbins
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming
We find strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly zero, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average about 20% on all final passage votes. Second, we find that, controlling for distance from the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than government parties. These results strongly suggest that governing parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates on decree-conversion bills and budget bills that on ordinary bills - consistent with our theoretical analysis of the differing procedures used in each case.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 47
Keywords: Italy, Chamber of Deputies, Agenda Control, Roll Rates, LegislaturesAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 5, 2007
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