Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019032
 
 

References (51)



 
 

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Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000


Gary W. Cox


Stanford University

William Heller


State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Political Science

Mathew D. McCubbins


Duke University


Legislative Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We find strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly zero, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average about 20% on all final passage votes. Second, we find that, controlling for distance from the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than government parties. These results strongly suggest that governing parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates on decree-conversion bills and budget bills that on ordinary bills - consistent with our theoretical analysis of the differing procedures used in each case.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: Italy, Chamber of Deputies, Agenda Control, Roll Rates, Legislatures

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Date posted: October 5, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Cox, Gary W. and Heller, William and McCubbins, Mathew D., Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000. Legislative Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019032

Contact Information

Gary W. Cox (Contact Author)
Stanford University ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-723-4278 (Phone)
William B. Heller
State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Political Science ( email )
Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
United States
Mathew D. McCubbins
Duke University ( email )
Department of Political Science
208 Gross Hall, 140 Science Drive
Durham, NC 27708
United States
(213) 973-7538 (Phone)
(213) 973-3623 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mccubbins.us
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