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Tradable Patent Rights
Ian Ayres Yale Law School; Yale School of Management Gideon Parchomovsky University of Pennsylvania Law School; Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law 2007 Stanford Law Review, Vol. 60, Pg. 863, 2007 U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 07-23 Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 350 Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 145 U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 07-43 Abstract: Patent thickets may inefficient retard cumulative innovation. This paper explores two alternative mechanisms that may be used to weed out patent thickets. Both mechanisms are intended to reduce the number of patents in our society. The first mechanism we discuss is price based regulation of patents through a system of increasing renewal fees. The second and more innovative mechanism is quantity based regulation through the establishment of a system of Tradable Patent Rights. The formalization of tradable patent rights would essentially create a secondary market for patent permits in which patent protection will be bought and sold.
Keywords: permits, thickets, license fees, licensing, social costs, infringement, renewal fees, tragedy of the commons, enforcement JEL Classifications: D23, K11, O34, Working Paper SeriesDate posted: October 10, 2007 ; Last revised: July 23, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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