Tradable Patent Rights
Yale University - Yale Law School; Yale University - Yale School of Management
University of Pennsylvania Law School; Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 60, Pg. 863, 2007
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 07-23
Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 350
Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 145
U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 07-43
Patent thickets may inefficient retard cumulative innovation. This paper explores two alternative mechanisms that may be used to weed out patent thickets. Both mechanisms are intended to reduce the number of patents in our society. The first mechanism we discuss is price based regulation of patents through a system of increasing renewal fees. The second and more innovative mechanism is quantity based regulation through the establishment of a system of Tradable Patent Rights. The formalization of tradable patent rights would essentially create a secondary market for patent permits in which patent protection will be bought and sold.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32
Keywords: permits, thickets, license fees, licensing, social costs, infringement, renewal fees, tragedy of the commons, enforcement
JEL Classification: D23, K11, O34,working papers series
Date posted: October 10, 2007 ; Last revised: May 25, 2014
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