|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Optimal Remedies for Bilateral ContractsFrancesco ParisiUniversity of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna Barbara LuppiUniversità degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics; University of St. Thomas School of Law Vincy FonGeorge Washington University - Department of Economics October 10, 2007 Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-45 Abstract: In a bilateral contract, should a breaching party be allowed to force the performance of his non-breaching counterpart? Should a breaching party be able to collect damages in contract if his counterpart was also in breach? In this paper we examine these interrelated questions. We consider situations where parties enter into a bilateral contract making reciprocal promises of performance. We extend the standard models of remedies in contracts to consider alternative breach remedies. The paper shows the distortion of incentives created by the application of a defense of non-performance in unilateral breach cases and by the application of preclusion rules in bilateral breach cases.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48 Keywords: Bilateral Contracts, Contract-Specific Investments, Remedies for Breach, Defense of Non-Performance, Preclusion Rules JEL Classification: K12, K41 working papers seriesDate posted: October 11, 2007 ; Last revised: June 3, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.751 seconds
