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Does Angel Participation Matter? An Analysis of Early Venture Financing
Brent D. Goldfarb University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business Gerard Hoberg University of Maryland - Department of Finance David Kirsch University of Maryland Alexander J. Triantis University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business March 24, 2009 Robert H. Smith School Research Paper No. RHS 06-072 Abstract: We examine the role of angel investors in early venture financing using a new sample of 182 Series A preferred stock rounds. Our sample includes deals in which angels invest alone, those where they co-invest with venture capitalists (VCs), and deals in which VCs invest alone. We find that investor composition is strongly related to control rights, and deals with more angel investors have weaker control rights. Our broad results regarding outcomes and investor selection are consistent with a constrained matching explanation regarding how firms pair with investor types. Among smaller deals, matching is unconstrained, and outcomes are not correlated with investor composition. Among larger deals, VC participation is generally a necessary condition for raising capital, and firms for which this constraint binds experience inferior outcomes.
Keywords: Venture Capital, Angel Investors, Entrepreneurship, Control Rights, Term Sheets JEL Classifications: G20, G24, G32 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: March 19, 2008 ; Last revised: July 17, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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