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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024240
 
 

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Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World: Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences


Holger Daske


University of Mannheim

Luzi Hail


University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Christian Leuz


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Center for Financial Studies (CFS); University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Financial Institutions Center; CESifo Research Network

Rodrigo S. Verdi


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

August 2008

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 198/2008
Chicago GSB Research Paper No. 12

Abstract:     
This paper examines the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS reporting around the world. We analyze the effects on market liquidity, cost of capital and Tobin's q in 26 countries using a large sample of firms that are mandated to adopt IFRS. We find that, on average, market liquidity increases around the time of the introduction of IFRS. We also document a decrease in firms' cost of capital and an increase in equity valuations, but only if we account for the possibility that the effects occur prior to the official adoption date. Partitioning our sample, we find that the capital-market benefits occur only in countries where firms have incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong, underscoring the central importance of firms' reporting incentives and countries' enforcement regimes for the quality of financial reporting. Comparing mandatory and voluntary adopters, we find that the capital market effects are most pronounced for firms that voluntarily switch to IFRS, both in the year when they switch and again later, when IFRS become mandatory. While the former result is likely due to self-selection, the latter result cautions us to attribute the capital-market effects for mandatory adopters solely or even primarily to the IFRS mandate. Many adopting countries have made concurrent efforts to improve enforcement and governance regimes, which likely play into our findings. Consistent with this interpretation, the estimated liquidity improvements are smaller in magnitude when we analyze them on a monthly basis, which is more likely to isolate IFRS reporting effects.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 74

Keywords: Regulation, International accounting, IAS, U.S. GAAP, Disclosure, Market liquidity, Cost of equity, Enforcement, Security markets

JEL Classification: G14, G15, G30, K22, M41, M42

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Date posted: October 25, 2007 ; Last revised: November 20, 2011

Suggested Citation

Daske, Holger and Hail, Luzi and Leuz, Christian and Verdi, Rodrigo S., Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World: Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences (August 2008). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 198/2008; Chicago GSB Research Paper No. 12. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024240 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1024240

Contact Information

Holger Daske
University of Mannheim ( email )
Schloss Ostflügel
Raum O 250
Mannheim, D-68131
Germany
Luzi Hail (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
215-898-8205 (Phone)
215-573-2054 (Fax)
Christian Leuz
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-1996 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://chicagobooth.edu/fac/christian.leuz
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.nber.org
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Center for Financial Studies (CFS) ( email )
Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany
University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Financial Institutions Center
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6218
United States
CESifo Research Network
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Rodrigo S. Verdi
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )
Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street E62-679
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
(617) 253 2956 (Phone)
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