Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024668
 
 

References (26)



 


 



Catching or Fining Speeders: A Political Economy Approach


Eef Delhaye


Transport & Mobility Leuven; KU Leuven - Energy Transport and Environment (ETE)

Stef Proost


KU Leuven - Department of Economics

Sandra Rousseau


KU Leuven - Center for Economic Studies; Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel (HUBrussel)

April 2007


Abstract:     
According to Becker (1968) it is best to use very high fines and low inspection probabilities to deter traffic accidents because inspection is costly. This paper uses a political economy model to analyse the choice of the fine and the inspection probability. There are two lobby groups: the vulnerable road users and the 'strong' road users. If only vulnerable road users are effective in lobbying, we find that the expected fine is higher than if only the interests of car drivers are taken into account. When we consider the choice between inspection probability and the magnitude of the fine for a given expected fine, we find that the fine preferred by the vulnerable road users is higher than socially optimal. The reverse holds if only the car drivers are effective lobbyists. The orders of magnitude are illustrated numerically for speeding and contrasted with current fines for drunk driving in the European Union.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Political economy, enforcement, traffic safety

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Date posted: October 26, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Delhaye, Eef and Proost, Stef and Rousseau, Sandra, Catching or Fining Speeders: A Political Economy Approach (April 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024668 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1024668

Contact Information

Eef Delhaye (Contact Author)
Transport & Mobility Leuven ( email )
Vital Decosterstraat 67A bus 0001
Leuven, 3000
Belgium
KU Leuven - Energy Transport and Environment (ETE) ( email )
Belgium
Stef Proost
KU Leuven - Department of Economics ( email )
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
016 32 66 35 (Phone)
016 32 67 96 (Fax)
Sandra Rousseau
KU Leuven - Center for Economic Studies ( email )
Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel (HUBrussel) ( email )
Stormstraat 2
Brussels, 1000
Belgium
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