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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024698
 
 

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Deterrence and the Corporate Death Penalty


Assaf Hamdani


Hebrew University - Faculty of Law

Alon Klement


Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law

October 20, 2007


Abstract:     
Criminal convictions of business entities can trigger their demise, as graphically illustrated by the unraveling of accounting firm Arthur Andersen. The threat of going out of business is commonly perceived as providing firms with powerful - perhaps even excessive - incentives to contain misconduct. This Essay, however, demonstrates that the corporate death penalty may undermine deterrence. Specifically, we show that in many cases harsh corporate penalties may lead to less monitoring for misconduct and undermine compliance incentives within professional firms. We also explore the conditions under which more lenient liability regimes - such as holding firms liable only for sufficiently pervasive misconduct - might enhance deterrence. Our analysis has implications not only for entity criminal liability but also for collective sanctions more generally. For example, the insight that draconian penalties might undermine deterrence in group settings sheds a new light on the wisdom of allowing law and accounting firms to organize as limited-liability entities.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Criminal Liability, Corporate Sanction, Marginal Deterrence, Collective Action

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Date posted: October 27, 2007 ; Last revised: January 31, 2009

Suggested Citation

Hamdani, Assaf and Klement, Alon, Deterrence and the Corporate Death Penalty (October 20, 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024698 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1024698

Contact Information

Assaf Hamdani
Hebrew University - Faculty of Law ( email )
Mount Scopus, 91905
Israel

Alon Klement (Contact Author)
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 167
Herzliya, 46150
Israel
97 29 952 7382 (Phone)
97 29 956 8605 (Fax)
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